getcgi接口存在堆栈溢出CVE-2024-41592 of DrayTek vigor3910 复现
漏洞简介
DrayTek Vigor3910 devices through 4.3.2.6 have a stack-based overflow when processing query string parameters because GetCGI mishandles extraneous ampersand characters and long key-value pairs.
CVE-2024-41592是DrayTek v3910_4.3.2.6版本中发现的一个堆栈溢出漏洞，漏洞点位于sohod64.bin的
getCGI() 函数中， 在该函数中处理字符串参数会造成越界导致栈溢出,精心构造报文可导致rce。
环境搭建
Vigor3910的架构为linux+qemu+rtos。
固件分析
固件下载Index of /Vigor3910/Firmware
下载到的固件为v3910_431.all，这是一个加密固件，直接用binwalk分析看不到有效信息，查看熵值为1。
可以尝试从旧版本未加密固件中寻找解密程序进行解密，比如v3910_3972。
图1
binwalk 分析固件信息如下，可以看出是未加密的。
图2
binwalk -Me v3972/v3910_3972.all无法直接提取文件系统。
图3
分析binwalk给出的固件信息。
➜ v3972 binwalk ./v3910_3972.allDECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
273054 0x42A9E Unix path: /home/eason_jhan/1000b/cavium/firmware/bdk/libbdk-os/bdk-rlock.c
280056 0x445F8 AES S-Box
280568 0x447F8 AES Inverse S-Box
283704 0x45438 SHA256 hash constants, little endian
469662 0x72A9E Unix path: /home/eason_jhan/1000b/cavium/firmware/bdk/libbdk-os/bdk-rlock.c
476664 0x745F8 AES S-Box
477176 0x747F8 AES Inverse S-Box
480312 0x75438 SHA256 hash constants, little endian
571444 0x8B834 AES Inverse S-Box
571700 0x8B934 AES S-Box
573012 0x8BE54 SHA256 hash constants, little endian
833588 0xCB834 AES Inverse S-Box
833844 0xCB934 AES S-Box
835156 0xCBE54 SHA256 hash constants, little endian
2032941 0x1F052D Neighborly text, "neighbor %d too different %d from average %d, picking %d.LMC%d.R%d: MAJORTY: Byte %d: picking majority of %d over average %d."
2057224 0x1F6408 AES S-Box
2057736 0x1F6608 AES Inverse S-Box
2079947 0x1FBCCB Unix path: /home/eason_jhan/1000b/cavium/firmware/bdk/libbdk-os/bdk-rlock.c
2096368 0x1FFCF0 SHA256 hash constants, little endian
2119768 0x205858 LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 65536 bytes, uncompressed size: 2285442 bytes
2886232 0x2C0A58 LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 65536 bytes, uncompressed size: 311880 bytes
3000920 0x2DCA58 LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 65536 bytes, uncompressed size: 630943 bytes
3155032 0x302458 Flattened device tree, size: 5542 bytes, version: 17
3160664 0x303A58 Flattened device tree, size: 4223 bytes, version: 17
3165272 0x304C58 Flattened device tree, size: 157 bytes, version: 17
3165784 0x304E58 Flattened device tree, size: 6321 bytes, version: 17
3172440 0x306858 Flattened device tree, size: 7806 bytes, version: 17
3180632 0x308858 Flattened device tree, size: 4081 bytes, version: 17
3184728 0x309858 Flattened device tree, size: 555 bytes, version: 17
3185752 0x309C58 Flattened device tree, size: 5957 bytes, version: 17
3191896 0x30B458 Flattened device tree, size: 157 bytes, version: 17
3192408 0x30B658 Flattened device tree, size: 6941 bytes, version: 17
3199576 0x30D258 Flattened device tree, size: 3577 bytes, version: 17
3203160 0x30E058 Flattened device tree, size: 4040 bytes, version: 17
3207256 0x30F058 Flattened device tree, size: 6840 bytes, version: 17
3214424 0x310C58 Flattened device tree, size: 4633 bytes, version: 17
3219544 0x312058 Flattened device tree, size: 8926 bytes, version: 17
3228760 0x314458 Flattened device tree, size: 4170 bytes, version: 17
3233368 0x315658 Flattened device tree, size: 5243 bytes, version: 17
3239000 0x316C58 Flattened device tree, size: 3618 bytes, version: 17
3243096 0x317C58 Flattened device tree, size: 157 bytes, version: 17
3243608 0x317E58 Flattened device tree, size: 3825 bytes, version: 17
3247704 0x318E58 Flattened device tree, size: 5242 bytes, version: 17
3253336 0x31A458 Flattened device tree, size: 3878 bytes, version: 17
3257432 0x31B458 Flattened device tree, size: 674 bytes, version: 17
3258456 0x31B858 Flattened device tree, size: 6157 bytes, version: 17
3265112 0x31D258 Flattened device tree, size: 6854 bytes, version: 17
3272280 0x31EE58 Flattened device tree, size: 3863 bytes, version: 17
3276376 0x31FE58 Flattened device tree, size: 803 bytes, version: 17
3277400 0x320258 Flattened device tree, size: 6321 bytes, version: 17
3284056 0x321C58 Flattened device tree, size: 3392 bytes, version: 17
3288152 0x322C58 Flattened device tree, size: 6840 bytes, version: 17
3295320 0x324858 Flattened device tree, size: 467 bytes, version: 17
3295832 0x324A58 Flattened device tree, size: 6321 bytes, version: 17
3302488 0x326458 Flattened device tree, size: 3392 bytes, version: 17
3306072 0x327258 Flattened device tree, size: 5910 bytes, version: 17
3330136 0x32D058 Flattened device tree, size: 15674 bytes, version: 17
3346008 0x330E58 Flattened device tree, size: 15674 bytes, version: 17
3361880 0x334C58 Flattened device tree, size: 15674 bytes, version: 17
3377752 0x338A58 Flattened device tree, size: 22635 bytes, version: 17
3400792 0x33E458 Flattened device tree, size: 24081 bytes, version: 17
3425368 0x344458 Flattened device tree, size: 16640 bytes, version: 17
3442264 0x348658 Flattened device tree, size: 21379 bytes, version: 17
3463768 0x34DA58 Flattened device tree, size: 14770 bytes, version: 17
3478616 0x351458 Flattened device tree, size: 15126 bytes, version: 17
3493976 0x355058 Flattened device tree, size: 15786 bytes, version: 17
3509848 0x358E58 Flattened device tree, size: 16204 bytes, version: 17
3526232 0x35CE58 Flattened device tree, size: 14856 bytes, version: 17
3541592 0x360A58 Flattened device tree, size: 15869 bytes, version: 17
3557526 0x364896 Copyright string: "Copyright (C) 2016, Cavium Inc."
3559079 0x364EA7 Copyright string: "copyright notice and this permission notice shall be"
3561562 0x36585A Unix path: /sys/class/gpio/gpio472) for DSL model
5052256 0x4D1760 CRC32 polynomial table, little endian
5058320 0x4D2F10 AES Inverse S-Box
5065888 0x4D4CA0 AES S-Box
5099137 0x4DCE81 Motorola S-Record; binary data in text format, record type: header
5259312 0x504030 Linux kernel ARM64 image, load offset: 0x80000, image size: 44011520 bytes, little endian, 4k page size,
5499456 0x53EA40 SHA256 hash constants, little endian
12693552 0xC1B030 ELF, 64-bit LSB shared object, version 1 (SYSV)
12741544 0xC26BA8 gzip compressed data, maximum compression, from Unix, last modified: 1970-01-01 00:00:00 (null date)
12820184 0xC39ED8 Intel x86 or x64 microcode, sig 0xffffff80, pf_mask 0x00, 1DE0-08-26, size 2048
12820328 0xC39F68 Intel x86 or x64 microcode, sig 0xffffff80, pf_mask 0x00, 1DE0-08-26, size 2048
12897440 0xC4CCA0 DES SP2, little endian
12897952 0xC4CEA0 DES SP1, little endian
12923200 0xC53140 LZO compressed data
12925744 0xC53B30 CRC32 polynomial table, little endian
13188944 0xC93F50 Copyright string: "Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Intel Corporation."
13196536 0xC95CF8 Copyright string: "Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012 Intel Corporation."
13197320 0xC96008 Copyright string: "Copyright (c) 1999-2008 Intel Corporation."
13199736 0xC96978 Copyright string: "Copyright (c) 2013 - 2016 Intel Corporation."
13410380 0xCCA04C Certificate in DER format (x509 v3), header length: 4, sequence length: 14848
14404968 0xDBCD68 Unix path: /dev/vc/0
14479296 0xDCEFC0 Ubiquiti partition header, header size: 56 bytes, name: "PARTNAME=%s", base address: 0x74790A00, data size: 23295090 bytes
14486472 0xDD0BC8 xz compressed data
14569424 0xDE4FD0 Unix path: /lib/firmware/updates/4.9.0-OCTEONTX_SDK_6_2_0_p3_build_38
14663912 0xDFC0E8 Ubiquiti firmware additional data, name: UTE DEVICE DIAGNOSTIC, size: 1145372672 bytes, size2: 0 bytes, CRC32: 0
14712280 0xE07DD8 Copyright string: "Copyright(c) 1999-2006 Intel Corporation"
14789199 0xE1AA4F Copyright string: "Copyright 2005-2007 Rodolfo Giometti <giometti@linux.it>"
14812265 0xE20469 Copyright string: "Copyright(c) Pierre Ossman"
14848048 0xE29030 Unix path: /sys/firmware/devicetree/base
14848848 0xE29350 Unix path: /sys/firmware/fdt': CRC check failed
14864129 0xE2CF01 Neighborly text, "neighbor table overflow!ate is %x"
15613000 0xEE3C48 LZ4 compressed data, legacy
15613426 0xEE3DF2 Executable script, shebang: "/bin/sh"
16971299 0x102F623 Unix path: /dev/net/tun.
17236166 0x10700C6 mcrypt 2.5 encrypted data, algorithm: "w", keysize: 332 bytes, mode: """,
19705376 0x12CAE20 XML document, version: "1.0"
20045201 0x131DD91 VMware4 disk image
20045848 0x131E018 Executable script, shebang: "/bin/sh"
20089785 0x1328BB9 AES Inverse S-Box
20090041 0x1328CB9 AES S-Box
20090329 0x1328DD9 DES PC1 table
20090417 0x1328E31 DES PC2 table
20111190 0x132DF56 Base64 standard index table
21756040 0x14BF888 Unix path: /sys/class/net/%s/phy80211
22373111 0x15562F7 Base64 standard index table
22816893 0x15C287D MPEG transport stream data
23678637 0x1694EAD Copyright string: "Copyright 1995-2005 Jean-loup Gailly "
23745388 0x16A536C PGP RSA encrypted session key - keyid: D8020270 1B1148DC RSA Encrypt-Only 1024b
24029059 0x16EA783 Unix path: /dev/net/tun
24056482 0x16F12A2 AES S-Box
24057270 0x16F15B6 AES Inverse S-Box
24533651 0x1765A93 eCos RTOS string reference: "ecosW"
24543379 0x1768093 HTML document header
24563221 0x176CE15 LUKS_MAGIC
24564177 0x176D1D1 xz compressed data
24873394 0x17B89B2 OpenSSL encryption, salted, salt: 0xC00770252D323573
24884301 0x17BB44D HTML document header
24906969 0x17C0CD9 Private key in DER format (PKCS header length: 4, sequence length: 2345
25343574 0x182B656 Unix path: /usr/local/shk
25480049 0x184CB71 Executable script, shebang: "/bin/bash"
26449086 0x19394BE SHA256 hash constants, little endian
26965826 0x19B7742 Cisco IOS microcode, for ""
27792979 0x1A81653 gzip compressed data, maximum compression, has header CRC, last modified: 1974-10-07 02:33:45 (bogus date)
30516402 0x1D1A4B2 HTML document header
30707709 0x1D48FFD Base64 standard index table
32138317 0x1EA644D HTML document header
32463276 0x1EF59AC PNG image, 32 x 24, 8-bit/color RGBA, interlaced
32463352 0x1EF59F8 Zlib compressed data, default compression
32492091 0x1EFCA3B GIF image data, version "89a", 5 x
32548082 0x1F0A4F2 JPEG image data, EXIF standard
32574798 0x1F10D4E Zlib compressed data, best compression
32577456 0x1F117B0 Zlib compressed data, best compression
32580729 0x1F12479 JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.02, thumbnail 11x98
32751022 0x1F3BDAE Zlib compressed data, best compression
32760485 0x1F3E2A5 Zlib compressed data, default compression
32767499 0x1F3FE0B JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.02
32822738 0x1F4D5D2 Zlib compressed data, best compression
32831773 0x1F4F91D XML document, version: "1.0"
32866201 0x1F57F99 JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.02
32905743 0x1F61A0F GIF image data, version "89a", 30 x 30
32943989 0x1F6AF75 Zlib compressed data, best compression
32947100 0x1F6BB9C Zlib compressed data, best compression
32954824 0x1F6D9C8 XML document, version: "1.0"
32972713 0x1F71FA9 JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01
33011108 0x1F7B5A4 PNG image, 52 x 5, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
33201563 0x1FA9D9B XML document, version: "1.0"
33236782 0x1FB272E PNG image, 1000 x 280, 8-bit/color RGBA, interlaced
33318819 0x1FC67A3 Zlib compressed data, best compression
33382838 0x1FD61B6 JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01
33382868 0x1FD61D4 TIFF image data, little-endian offset of first image directory: 8
33516114 0x1FF6A52 ZBOOT firmware header, header size: 32 bytes, load address: 0x9C54505A, start address: 0x8B844857, checksum: 0x4F8B885F, version: 0xFF979388, image size: 991901497 bytes
33609975 0x200D8F7 PNG image, 300 x 84, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
33776158 0x203621E XML document, version: "1.0"
33809104 0x203E2D0 PNG image, 310 x 531, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
33809203 0x203E333 Zlib compressed data, best compression
34312241 0x20B9031 JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01
34352652 0x20C2E0C TIFF image data, big-endian, offset of first image directory: 8
34799229 0x212FE7D Base64 standard index table
35201331 0x2192133 AES S-Box
35201587 0x2192233 AES Inverse S-Box
35282151 0x21A5CE7 HTML document header
35375557 0x21BC9C5 Base64 standard index table
38441243 0x24A911B Certificate in DER format (x509 v3), header length: 4, sequence length: 873
38694241 0x24E6D61 Executable script, shebang: "/bin/bash"
38694568 0x24E6EA8 Unix path: /dev/net/tun
39750489 0x25E8B59 Unix path: /usr/lib64/tc/
39881890 0x2608CA2 Copyright string: "Copyright (C) 2004 by Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>"
40546844 0x26AB21C Unix path: /home/ruby/X
40667261 0x26C887D Copyright string: "Copyright (C) 2018, Thomas G. Lane, Guido Vollbeding"
40692035 0x26CE943 Unix path: /home/ruby/X
42108450 0x2828622 Copyright string: "Copyright (C) 2018, Thomas G. Lane, Guido Vollbeding"
42240067 0x2848843 Copyright string: "Copyright (C) 2018, Thomas G. Lane, Guido Vollbeding"
42600735 0x28A091F gzip compressed data, ASCII, from VM/CMS, last modified: 1995-08-24 06:41:07
42608185 0x28A2639 ELF, 64-bit LSB processor-specific,
42845890 0x28DC6C2 Neighborly text, "neighbor C %s"
43871781 0x29D6E25 Unix path: /home/ruby/X
44237701 0x2A30385 Executable script, shebang: "/bin/sh"
44249877 0x2A33315 OpenSSH RSA public key
45239782 0x2B24DE6 SHA256 hash constants, little endian
45601353 0x2B7D249 gzip compressed data, ASCII, from VM/CMS, last modified: 2008-04-20 10:46:28
47200461 0x2D038CD SHA256 hash constants, little endian
47222790 0x2D09006 AES Inverse S-Box固件基本结构通常包含bootloader、kernel、rootfs等等，在binwalk给出的固件信息中他们具有一些可识别的特征。
bootloader通常位于固件开头，存在bdk，加密算法如AES、SHA等字样。
kernel通常以压缩数据开头，存在ftb设备树标识，kernel header。
rootfs通常以压缩数据开头，存在Executable script，图片、html标识，压缩数据。
根据这些判断0- 2119767为bootloader，2119768-15613425为kernel，15613426-末尾为rootfs。
旧固件提取
使用dd命令提取rootfs。
➜ v3972 dd if=v3910_3972.all of=fs.lz4 bs=1 skip=15613000 count=$((48978480-15613000))
33365480+0 records in
33365480+0 records out
33365480 bytes (33 MB, 32 MiB) copied, 80.5077 s, 414 kB/s
安转lz4解压缩。
sudo apt-get install liblz4-tool➜ v3972 file fs.lz4
fs.lz4: LZ4 compressed data (v0.1-v0.9)➜ v3972 lz4 -d fs.lz4
Decoding file fs
Error 53 : Decoding Failed ! Corrupted input detected !
虽然有报错，但还是解压出了文件系统fs，file查看到是打包的cpio格式。
➜ v3972 file fs
fs: ASCII cpio archive (SVR4 with no CRC)
用binwalk直接提取的到文件系统。
图4
寻找解密程序
解密程序一定与固件的更新和升级相关，尝试在文件系统中搜索update、upgrade、firmware等字符。
➜ cpio-root grep -i -r 'upgrade' -l ./
./usr/sbin/tcpdump
./usr/bin/qemu-system-aarch64
./sbin/rc
./etc/runcommand/gci_exp
./etc/runcommand/fw_upload
./lib64/libitm.so.1.0.0
./testfunc/misc.sh
./testfunc/auto_cfg_err.sh
./firmware/run.sh
./firmware/vqemu/sohod64.bin
./lib/libspice-server.so.1
./lib/libspice-server.so
./lib/libext2fs.so.2.4
./lib/libspice-server.so.1.13.0
➜ cpio-root grep -i -r 'upgrade' -l ./ | grep f
./etc/runcommand/fw_upload
./testfunc/misc.sh
./testfunc/auto_cfg_err.sh
./firmware/run.sh
./firmware/vqemu/sohod64.bin
./lib/libext2fs.so.2.4
./etc/runcommand/fw_upload是一个shell脚本，其中包含了完整的固件升级流程。
结合ai分析找到如下关键部分，用fw_unpacker对固件进行解包，再chacha20解密。
图5
加密固件提取
从shell脚本中大概能看出fw_unpacker所需参数为-i firmware -o ./dir/ -m ?
不知道这个-m是用来做什么的，ida分析一下，程序判断了-i、-o、-m都不能为空，model参数需要和v12相同才能进行正常的解包。
图6
fw_unpacker为aarch64架构，用qemu运行一下看看情况。可以看到fw为v3910，也就是说model也必须是v3910。
图7
修改model再次尝试，可以看到解包成功，得到如下文件。
图8
之后再用chacha20解密，从./etc/runcommand/fw_upload中可以看出其参数如下
chacha20 enc file denc file TMP_FW_OUTPUT_FOLDER/nonce
尝试解密，成功得到一个解密镜像，这个镜像结构就和v3910_3972很相似了。
图9
用dd从解密得到的镜像中提取出文件系统部分，lz4解压，binwalk提取就能得到文件系统。
图10
图11
固件模拟
参考网上文章CVE-2024-41592 vigor 栈溢出漏洞分析，从etc下寻找init相关文件，inittab中执行了/sbin/rc
图12
从/sbin/rc中找到一个/firmware/run.sh，提到了run_linux.sh，
图13
run_linux.sh中提到了执行fw_setenv purelinux 1和setup_qemu_linux.sh，从中可以看出最终是用qemu启动了./vqemu/sohod64.bin提供服务的。前者是用来设置环境变量。
图14
分析后者setup_qemu_linux.sh发现只要用来设置网络。用到了两张网卡，分别是eth0和eth1。先将网卡创建出来。
sudo ip tuntap add dev eth0 mode tap sudo ip tuntap add dev eth1 mode tap sudo ip link set eth0 up sudo ip link set eth1 up
依次启动setup_qemu_linux.sh和run_linux.sh就可以启动服务了。
但是我在运行时始终卡在这一步，并且似乎还有报错信息。
!! snprintf function can't meet draytek's requirement!
图15
参考其他文章CVE-2024-41592 vigor 栈溢出漏洞分析得知启动服务的qemu是经过厂商二次开发的，而我用的是本地安转的qemu。需要下载官方提供的源码编译qemu启动服务。
DrayTek File Server
./configure --enable-kvm --enable-debug --target-list=aarch64-softmmu
make
将编译得到的qemu-system-aarch64放到/firmware下再启动服务即可。
漏洞分析
ida分析./vqemu/sohod64.bin文件，漏洞产生于getcgi函数中，它几乎在所有cgi函数中均会被调用用来解析请求参数。通过搜索字符串QUERY_STRING的方式对其定位。
首先比较是否是GET请求，接着从请求中提取原始的payload，通过循环为payload中每个键值对分配堆空间，将堆地址写到栈中，如图16所示。
makeword会从payload中以&为分隔符匹配键值对，并为其分配堆内存，将键的堆地址写进栈里(stack_addr + 8 * idx)，随后对值进行url解码，将值的堆地址存放在（(stack_addr + 8 * idx+4)）如图17所示，在这一过程中，并未对idx大小做限制，只要payload数据不为空，就不断循环分配堆地址写到栈中，如果构造大量的&符号，就可以造成堆栈溢出覆盖函数返回地址为堆地址。
图16
图17
图17来源：forescout.com/resources/draybreak-draytek-research/
直接覆盖返回地址会导致程序崩溃，因为在每个cgi函数return之前，程序都会调用FreeCtrlName()，将之前makeword函数分配的堆地址置0，这个地址是用来存放键值对的键的堆地址，在栈地址低地址处，在高地址的用来存放键值对的值的堆地址却未被置0,如图19所示。
图18
图19
图19来源：forescout.com/resources/draybreak-draytek-research/
要劫持执行流就必须绕过FreeCtrlName()函数，它的循环条件是栈地址不为空，所以需要找到一个cgi，在执行了get_cgi()之后，能向图4中Query_String_Buffer到Return_Address之间的区域写一个0，来终止FreeCtrlName()的执行。如果要完成未授权rce，则这个cgi还必须是不需要认证就可以执行的。
调试分析
在run_linux.sh的qemu-system-aarh64添加-s参数便于调试，启动服务后，在终端运行如下命令进入调试。（启动服务后不要立即进入调试，这可能会影响服务的初始化，即使顺利进入gdb也难以进行有效调试，尽量等待终端循环显示reboot qemu后再进入调试）
gdb-multiarch --eval-command="set architecture aarch64" --eval-command="target remote localhost:1234"
进入调试后在get_cgi函数下断点，接着发送请求，然后c过去。
http://192.168.1.1/cgi-bin/wlogin.cgi?&&&
图20
如下图所示执行流已经到了getcgi中的makeword()处，继续执行。
图21
由于是通过跳转指令进入子函数的，之前在传统的x86架构gdb调试中使用n去单步步过子函数是不生效的，finish命令也达不到想要的功效，可以在子函数的返回地址下个断点再c过去比较快。
如图所示，x7存放的是由makeword()分配给键值对的堆地址，它将被存储在x20中的栈地址0x468412f0处。
图22
如图所示，红框1是键值对的键分配的堆地址，他们都存放在8字节栈地址的低地址处，由于请求中只有&符，所以0x468412f0的高4字节地址处为空。aarch64与x86开辟栈帧的方式有所不同，getcgi函数的返回地址在红框1上面也就是栈的低地址处，红框2存放的是调用getcgi的函数funcB（vuln.cgi）的返回地址，以此类推，红框3存放的是调用funcB的函数funcA的返回地址，下图与图17相对应。
图23
堆栈溢出只能向栈的高地址处覆盖，所以劫持执行流需要覆盖funcB（vuln.cgi）的返回地址。
漏洞验证
启动仿真环境，正常启动后，程序循环打印reboot qemu。
图24
这时已经可以访问到web页面，默认账号密码是admin:admin。
图25
找到一个cgi，在请求参数时填入大量&。
http://192.168.1.1/cgi-bin/wlogin.cgi?&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
服务崩溃如下图所示。
图26
总结
解密固件的方法难度比较高，但具有一定的通用性。
这个设备的固件未开启canary保护，是实现rce的关键条件。
固件仿真需要深入分析启动相关文件，处理报错，解决报错，难度较高。
参考文章
forescout.com/resources/draybreak-draytek-research/
DrayTek Vigor3910 CVE-2024-41592分析 | CN-SEC 中文网
CVE-2024-41592 vigor 栈溢出漏洞分析
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